The Enforceability of Default Interest in Real Estate Mortgages by Bender, Steven W.
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Faculty Scholarship 
1-1-2008 
The Enforceability of Default Interest in Real Estate Mortgages 
Steven W. Bender 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Steven W. Bender, The Enforceability of Default Interest in Real Estate Mortgages, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & 
EST. L.J. 199 (2008). 
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/521 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF DEFAULT INTEREST
IN REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES
Steven W. Bender*
Michael T. Madison**
Editors' Synopsis: This Article examines the use of default
interest rate provisions in real estate mortgage loan transac-
tions and the varying ways courts assess the enforceability of
such provisions. The authors argue that these provisions are
important to lenders, ensuring that they are able to recover the
transaction costs and risks associated with defaulting borrow-
ers. The Article asserts that, due to the importance of these
provisions to lenders' financial stability, courts should apply
the unconscionability standard with a deference to freedom of
contract principles before refusing to enforce default interest
rate provisions. The authors also outline guidelines lenders
should follow in both drafting loan agreements containing
these provisions and defending against challenges to the impo-
sition of default interest rates.
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In both residential and commercial real estate mortgage loan transac-
tions, if the borrower fails to make a debt-service payment in a timely
manner, often the terms of the loan will require the borrower to pay late
charges expressed as a fixed dollar amount or as a percentage of the
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missed installment.' The loan documents also may require the borrower to
pay a higher default interest rate during default and perhaps even after the
default is cured.' Typically, once the debt is accelerated after default, the
late charges stop, but interest continues to accrue at the default rate on the
accelerated loan balance.3
Outside of bankruptcy, courts traditionally have enforced default
interest provisions under freedom of contract principles.4 Courts have
struck down these provisions only when the borrower has met the strict
standards of the unconscionability doctrine, as distinguished from the less
I Often the late fee is expressed both in terms of a fixed dollar amount and as a
percentage. For example, 5% of the late installment or $100, whichever is greater (or
less).2 Query whether a contract provision that imposes the default rate after the default is
cured is contrary to the policy behind some states' reinstatement or arrearage laws, which
allow 3the debtor to cure the default and decelerate the loan prior to the foreclosure sale.
Courts tend to reject the imposition of late fees after acceleration of the loan, either
by interpreting the late fee provision as inapplicable on acceleration or by finding such
imposition unenforceable as a penalty. See, e.g., LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Shepherd
Mall Partners, L.L.C., 140 P.3d 559 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006) (holding that application of
5% late fee to entire accelerated balance is an unenforceable penalty). Related to cases
refusing to invoke a late fee following acceleration are those denying late fees after
initiation of foreclosure, see Centerbank v. D'Assaro, 600 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1993), and those refusing to allow a late charge on a tardy balloon payment, see, e.g.,
Poseidon Dev., Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, L.L.C., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (interpreting note's plain language to deny late fee on balloon payment; if 10% late
fee had been intended to apply to balloon payment, it would have been an unenforceable
penalty); Art Country Squire, L.L.C. v. Inland Mortgage Corp., 745 N.E.2d 885 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that, as matter of contract interpretation, late fee did not apply to
balloon payment).
4 See Smiley v. Manufactured Hous. Assoc. Ii Ltd. P'ship, 679 So. 2d 1229 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding trial court without authority to refuse to enforce default rate
not to exceed 18%; contract rate was 8.5%); Chem. Bank v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
of Chi., 535 N.E.2d 940 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (seeing no reason to relieve sophisticated
borrower from agreed upon default rate). In addition to common law regulation, federal
and some state statutes regulate the collection of default interest for certain consumer
mortgage transactions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d) (2000) (prohibiting default interest
higher than the contract rate in nonpurchase-money mortgage loans that are high-cost,
defined as having an annual rate exceeding the Treasury yield by more than 10% or
having total points or fees due at closing exceeding 8% of the loan or $400. States such as
Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee have
similar restrictions for high cost home loans. Louisiana is one of the few states that
regulate default rates of commercial loans. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3509 (West
1997) (capping default rate based on loan amount, for example, at the greater of 18% or
three percentage points over the contract rate, for loans with an original principal balance
of $250,000 or less).
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stringent test under a liquidated damages versus penalty analysis, or so-
called reasonableness standard. This unconscionability analysis is consis-
tent with the judicial standards courts have applied to challenges to other
loan charges, such as fees for prepayment of loans.' However, some
courts have begun applying a reasonableness standard to govern the
enforceability of default interest charges.6 This Article articulates the
theoretical and practical arguments favoring the unconscionability stan-
dard and suggests that courts applying the reasonableness standard should
nonetheless give the lender appropriate latitude for these provisions. This
analysis is timely-against the backdrop of the so-called mortgage melt-
down of 2008, more courts may have occasion to consider the appropriate
standards for enforceability of default interest.
I. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF DEFAULT INTEREST
The standard note for both residential and commercial real estate
mortgage loans contains provisions designed to ensure that the mortgage
lender will receive a designated amount of interest income over a desig-
nated period of time and a return of its debt capital once the loan matures.
A default interest provision that requires the borrower to pay an increased
interest rate should the borrower default in making a monthly debt-service
payment or otherwise default under the terms of the note, mortgage, or
both, is fundamental to protecting mortgage lenders' expectations. Such
default interest provisions are designed to compensate the lender for a
5 See, e.g., Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. S.F. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417
(Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (upholding a prepayment fee even though the interest rate was
substantially less than the lender could have earned by lending the recaptured funds to
someone else). The litmus test for enforceability, in the opinion of the court, was not
whether the prepayment charge was an unreasonable penalty, such as under a liquidated
damages versus penalty analysis, but whether the charge was "palpably exorbitant." Id. at
240. See generally MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER & STEVEN W. BENDER, THE
LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 5:35 (rev. ed. 2004). But if the court confronts a
prepayment clause that operates more like a late fee, the court may be inclined to apply
the less rigorous reasonableness standard. For example, in Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan
Ass'n, 953 P.2d 484 (Cal. 1998), the California Supreme Court encountered a clause in the
mortgage note that imposed a charge of six months' interest if the borrower prepaid the
loan and had made a prior late payment or otherwise defaulted under the loan. Treating
this clause as a late payment fee, to which the court applied the standard of
reasonableness, rather than as a prepayment charge, to which the exorbitance or
unconscionability standard would apply, the court viewed the clause as an unenforceable
penalty for default.
6 See Art Country Squire, L.L.C. v. Inland Mortgage Corp., 745 N.E.2d 885 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001); MetLife Capital Fin. Corp. v. Wash. Ave. Assocs. L.P., 732 A.2d 493 (N.J.
1999).
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wide range of losses and risks, both those flowing from the particular
defaulted loan and borrower and those from the pool of defaulted loans
that the borrower has joined. Among other things, these losses include:
the loss of regular contract interest income during the term of the loan; the
opportunity costs of foregoing other investments during the default pe-
riod; the need for regulated lenders to place additional money on reserve
based on defaulted loans in their portfolio (which diverts money from
income-producing investments); 7 the possibility that the negative impact
of a nonperforming loan on the lender's balance sheet could cause regula-
tory problems and make obtaining funding in the credit markets more
expensive; and the additional internal administrative costs the lender must
incur to monitor and otherwise deal with a defaulted loan.
Historically, mortgage lenders rarely are made whole by foreclosure
sales. To illustrate, a well-grounded empirical study conducted by a
nationally known real estate scholar, analyzed 448 real estate foreclosures
in Illinois. Her study revealed that, in most cases, the only bidder at the
sale was the foreclosing mortgagee.8 In addition, in roughly 90 percent of
the cases the value of the property did not exceed the amount of the debt
secured by the property plus the typical costs to carry and resell the
property. 9
It being self-evident that lenders are not made whole again by foreclo-
sure sales, why would a borrower allow the mortgaged property to go to
foreclosure if the property were worth more than the mortgage balance
and the borrower had a meaningful amount of equity in the property? In
such cases, common sense dictates that the borrower would either file for
bankruptcy to stave off the foreclosure sale or, in the alternative, simply
attempt to sell the property for an amount that exceeds the outstanding
balance of the loan.' Additionally, in those jurisdictions that allow lend-
ers to seek any shortfall, only a small number of deficiency judgments are
collected by mortgage lenders." According to one study, the overall net ,
7 See HARRIS OMINSKY, REAL ESTATE LORE: MODERN TECHNIQUES AND EVERYDAY
TIPS FOR THE PRACTITIONER 67 (2006).
8 See Debra P. Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and
Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 663
(1997).
The study also found the typical carrying and resale costs to the lender were about
10% of the final judgment amount. See id. at 661.
10 Rather than purchase at the foreclosure sale where there is little or no opportunity
to perform due diligence on the property without the owner's cooperation, many
distressed property purchasers seek out the borrower before the scheduled sale date and
attempt to negotiate a sale involving a presale redemption of the loan.
See William C. Prather, A Realistic Approach to Foreclosure, 14 BuS. LAW. 132,
HeinOnline  -- 43 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 202 2008-2009
The Enforceability of Default Interest 203
loss recovery for all reported commercial mortgage foreclosures from
1986 through 1995 was only approximately 69 percent. 2
In addition to assuming the risk of losing its debt capital, a foreclos-
ing lender must assume the risk of loss based on the expenses and costs
associated with the foreclosure process. According to a 2004 Freddie Mac
study, the full foreclosure process is estimated to cost a lender an average
of $58,792 and take 18 months to resolve.' 3 Although the promissory note
calls for reimbursement of collection expenses and reasonable attorneys'
fees, this provision does not readily encompass the lender's own internal
costs in collecting the debt. These costs include engaging and monitoring
legal counsel, reviewing reports obtained in connection with the foreclo-
sure (such as a property condition report and an appraisal), monitoring
property insurance coverage, ensuring payment of real estate taxes, com-
plying with discovery requests in a judicial foreclosure proceeding, and
otherwise participating in any foreclosure action as well as defending
against any challenges to the lender's rights and remedies pursued by the
borrower. In addition, state or federal regulatory agencies, such as the
state banking department, sometimes require the lender to undertake an
analysis of the defaulted loan to assess its options, such as selling the
delinquent mortgage or foreclosure. 4 Should the mortgagee obtain title in
the foreclosure sale, as is typical, the lender faces holding costs (property
maintenance," insurance, taxes, assessments, and utilities); resale transac-
tion costs, such as a broker's commission; and the internal administrative
costs associated with the time involved in undertaking and monitoring
these tasks. Presumably, these internal costs in the foreclosure cycle must
take into account not only the salary and benefits of the lender's employ-
ees, but also the overhead costs of office space and office-related ex-
penses.
135 (1958).
12 See Brian A. Ciochetti, Loss Characteristics of Commercial Mortgage Fore-
closures, 13 REAL EST. FIN. 53, 54 (1997).
13 See Amy Crews Cutts & Richard K. Green, INNOVATIVE SERVICING TECH-
NOLOGY: SMART ENOUGH TO KEEP PEOPLE IN THEIR HOUSES? 16 (Freddie Mac, Working
Paper No. 04-03, 2004) (citing Craig Focardi, SERVICING DEFAULT MANAGEMENT: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS AND UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGY (TowerGroup Research Note
No. 033-13C, Nov. 15, 2002)).
14 See OMINSKY, supra note 7, at 68.
15 One court recently ruled that a lender who purchased property at a judicial sale
had a duty to exercise care to prevent a fire that damaged adjoining property, even when
the court had not yet confirmed the foreclosure sale. See O'Connell v. ABN AMRO
Mortgage Group, Inc., No. 2006-CA-000327-MR, 2007 WL 867632, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App.
Mar. 23, 2007).
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Moreover, some lenders have special workout or distressed loan
departments that handle loans in default. Presumably all the salary and
overhead costs of these groups are fairly allocated to delinquent loans by
means of late fees and default interest rates. 16 And some loans, once
securitized and serviced on behalf of the security holders, might see the
servicing function transferred to a special servicer after default with a
higher fee structure.' 7
II. ENFORCEABILITY UNDER THE UNCONSCIONABILITY
STANDARD
In applying the unconscionability standard to curtail exorbitantly
unfair terms in the loan contract, courts have drawn heavily on the Uni-
form Commercial Code's (UCC) articulation of unconscionability in the
context of contracts for the sale of goods. Under the UCC, "[tlhe basic
test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are
so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at
the time of the making of the contract."' 8 Most courts apply this
unconscionability standard with deference to freedom of contract princi-
ples. 19
16 See OMINSKY, supra note 7, at 69.
17 See id. at 68.
18 UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2003), IA U.L.A. 344 (2004). See, e.g.,
Hamm v. Taylor, 429 A.2d 946, 948-49 (Conn. 1980) (insisting mortgage lender be
afforded an opportunity to make a factual showing of the particular commercial
circumstances that would justify a seemingly inequitable term in the mortgage or
mortgage note, stating, "[f]inancial circumstances of the borrower, the increased risk
associated with a second mortgage, and the income-producing capacity of the mortgaged
property are some of the questions of fact that might appropriately be explored to shed
light on whether a designated interest rate is or is not unconscionable."). The Kansas
Supreme Court has listed ten factors relevant to an unconscionability determination. See
Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906-07 (Kan. 1976). Colorado has listed seven
of these factors. See Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 991 (Colo. 1986).
19 See, e.g., LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Shook, No. 549266, 2000 WL 1513923, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2000) (holding default interest rate enforceable as written
because the payment of default interest was contractually agreed upon and the courts did
not have the latitude to reject the agreement); Cantamar, L.L.C. v. Champagne,142 P.3d
140, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a 30% default rate was not unconscionable
because "[a] party claiming unconscionability bears a heavy burden," and "[c]ourts will
not 'assume the paternalistic role of declaring that one who has freely bound himself need
not perform because the bargain is not favorable."') (quoting Bekins Bar V Ranch v.
Huth, 664 P.2d. 455, 459 (Utah 1983)).
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Commentators have articulated the judicial standard for unconsciona-
ble terms as one demanding both oppression and unfair surprise.20 Unfair
surprise looks to unfairness in the bargaining process, whereas oppression
explores the substantive unfairness of the contract terms. As summarized
in the Calamari and Perillo treatise, substantive unconscionability focuses
on the "content of the contract," as distinguished from procedural
unconscionability, which focuses on the "process by which the allegedly
offensive terms found their way into the agreement. '21 The late Professor
Leff first observed and coined this distinction between what he colorfully
termed "bargaining naughtiness" in the contract formation process (proce-
dural unconscionability) and "evils in the resulting contract" (substantive
unconscionability).22
In cases involving the loan transaction terms, typically a borrower
attempts to demonstrate unfair surprise by pointing to a lack of knowl-
edge of the unfair term, perhaps because the term was hidden in
boilerplate, the borrower failed to understand English, or the lender
fraudulently misrepresented the contract terms.2 3 Alternatively, the bor-
20 See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 9-37 (3d ed. 1987)
(quoted in Cheshire Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1134 n.14 (Conn.
199211 Id. See also Industralease Automated Sci. Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., Inc.,
396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) ("Procedural unconscionability in general
is involved with the contract formation process, and focuses on high pressures exerted on
the parties, fine print of the contract, misrepresentation, or unequal bargaining position.");
Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1995) ("Procedural unconscionability
has been described as the lack of a meaningful choice, considering all the circumstances
surrounding the transaction including '[t]he manner in which the contract was entered,'
whether each party had "a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract,'
and whether 'the important terms [were] hidden in a maze of fine print."') (quoting
Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 544 P.2d 20, 23 (Wash. 1975)); Schroeder, 544 P.2d at
20 (suggesting that substantive unconscionability, on the other hand, is involved with the
content of the terms of the contract per se, such as inflated prices, unfair disclaimers, or
termination clauses).
22 Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).
23 See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999) (determining that
Pennsylvania law provides support for certain claims of procedural unconscionability that
are based on inconspicuous or unclear contractual language, in particular, if the
contracting parties have unequal bargaining power); Monetary Funding Group, Inc. v.
Pluchino, 867 A.2d 841 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (upholding finding of unconscionability
where lender charged arbitrarily high fees and misrepresented the fees to the borrower).
See also Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equip. Co., 595 A.2d 1190, 1196-97 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991) (finding disclaimer of warranties clause that appeared in fine print and on
reverse side of sales agreement unconscionable when disadvantaged party was not an
experienced buyer); Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 145-47 (Pa.
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rower may point to procedural unfairness involving a lack of voluntari-
ness in situations in which the borrower was under compulsion to obtain
the loan, and the lender took advantage of the borrower's circumstances
to impose outrageous terms on the borrower.24 Courts scrutinize the loan
transaction to ascertain whether there were any circumstances of compul-
sion that forced the borrower to enter into the mortgage loan.
Courts generally determine unconscionability under this two-prong
analysis, which consists of a substantive and a procedural component.
While substantive unconscionability by itself is sometimes sufficient to
Super. Ct. 1985) (finding confession of judgment clause that appeared in fine print in
boilerplate language of standard form contract was unenforceable when party clearly did
not understand its significance). Cf Family Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Spencer, 677 A.2d 479
(Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (upholding trial court's determination of unconscionability when
the loan payments approximated the borrower's monthly income and the borrower had
limited English ability, was uneducated, and could not read well). But see Cheshire
Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130 (Conn. 1992) (upholding the trial court's
finding of an absence of procedural unconscionability, which was fatal to the borrowers'
claim, despite the borrowers' argument that their mortgage loan was procedurally and
substantively unfair and, thus, unconscionable, and that they were unrepresented by
counsel and failed to understand English. The trial court found they were competent in the
English language and were intelligent persons who understood United States legal and
financial systems); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563
(Pa. 1983) (stating that failure to read or lack of knowledge of clearly drafted contractual
provision does not warrant avoidance or nullification of its provisions).
24 See Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co. of Iowa, 855 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding
both that a loan was unconscionable and that the lender deprived the borrower of fair
notice when the recently unemployed borrower called the lender seeking to refinance her
loan to cover outstanding obligations, and the lender failed to notify her that she could
have received a significantly less expensive loan with a repayment period half as long as
the loan actually granted).
25 See, e.g., Four J. Funding, Inc. v. Land Pres., L.L.C., No. CV0300827345, 2004
WL 3130562, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2004) (borrower and guarantor argued the
default rate of 2% a month (24% per annum) was unconscionable, but the court found the
defendants had a choice not to agree to this default rate at the outset of the loan, or
alternatively, to pay the note in a timely manner and thus avoid the default interest rate).
See also Iamartino v. Avallone, 477 A.2d 124, 126 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (finding
nondefault interest rate calculated at either 37% or 45% was not procedurally unfair;
among other factors, court considered that lender was not the only source of the mortgage
loan sought by borrower); Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014, 1020 (Okla. 1976)
(finding claimant who borrowed money at high nondefault interest rate to avoid
foreclosure of commercial property had the alternative of selling the property before
foreclosure); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983) (finding loans
with 36% and 58% interest rates not unconscionable despite the borrower's compulsion to
save ranch, because selling a portion of the ranch would have raised funds to save the
rest).
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find a contract unconscionable,26 procedural unconscionability alone will
not meet this threshold.27 Thus, even in the presence of indications of
procedural unfairness, a default interest rate should be upheld under the
unconscionability standard if the agreed upon default rate of interest is
substantively fair and not oppressive.28 While there is no precise recipe to
guide them,29 when looking for procedural and substantive unconscion-
26 See generally Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and
Unconscionability: The Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest
Rates Under the Unconscionability Standard, 31 HOUs. L. REV. 721, 747 (1994).
27 The Court of Appeals of Utah explained this principle: "Utah courts engage in a
two-pronged analysis to determine whether a contract is unconscionable: (1) substantive
unconscionability and (2) procedural unconscionability. . . . While a determination of
substantive unconscionability may by itself lead to our concluding the contract was
unconscionable, procedural unconscionability alone 'rarely render[s] a contract
unconscionable."' Cantamar, L.L.C. v. Champagne, 142 P.3d 140, 152 (Utah Ct. App.
2006). See also Belcher v. Kier, 558 So. 2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
that despite the presence of procedural unconscionability in the formation of land rental
agreements, the rent increases in question were not grossly excessive and thus not
substantively unconscionable, thereby precluding the court from finding unconscionability
in the rental contracts). Procedural unfairness that is sufficiently egregious to invoke
contract avoidance, such as fraud and duress, however, may allow invalidation of the
contract under these independent doctrines.
28 The Connecticut Supreme Court recognized the relevance of prevailing charges
and rates in assessing the substantive oppression of a mortgage loan transaction. See
Cheshire Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d at 1130, 1138 (Conn. 1992) (finding
the terms of the no-income verification loan, including the equivalent of a 33.7% contract
nondefault rate, were not so one-sided as to be unconscionable as a matter of law). A
California appellate court struck down a contract interest rate of ten times the market
interest rate by reference to price unconscionability cases for sales of goods under the
UCC. See Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). These cases
typically relieve purchasers from the contract price under the unconscionability doctrine
only when the contract price is more than two times the retail value of the goods. See
generally Bender, supra note 26, at 756.
29 See Pierce v. Emigrant Mortgage Co., 463 F. Supp. 2d 221, 225-26 (D. Conn.
2006) for a detailed analysis of the factors considered when evaluating procedural and
substantive unconscionability in the context of default interest rates. The procedural
factors include representation by counsel in the formation of the contract and potential
conflicts of interest influencing that counsel, and the substantive factors include interest
rate terms, loan acceleration, and late fees. Suppose, for example, the contract
(nondefault) interest rate is an adjustable rate, and the loan has a fixed default rate and a
lengthy loan term. The rate spread between the fixed default rate and the contract rate may
decrease over the life of the loan due to inflationary pressures in the economy that drive
the adjustable contract rate up thus reducing the lender's compensation for risk and
damages in the event of default. Indeed, if inflationary pressures during the next three
decades (for a thirty year residential loan) recapture the high interest rates of the late
1970s and early 1980s, despite the prevailing contract rates today in the single digits, an
18% default rate, for example, would approximate the interest rates charged twenty-five
SUMMER 2008
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ability, courts tend to apply a "sliding scale" analysis, under which a
compelling finding of one prong of unconscionability might support a
determination of unconscionability in the face of a weaker prong.3"
III. ENFORCEABILITY UNDER THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD
When scrutinizing contractual late charges, courts tend to apply the
liquidated damages standard of reasonableness rather than a relaxed (from
the lender's viewpoint) standard of unconscionability.3" But appellate
courts in some jurisdictions (for example, New Jersey and Indiana) have
begun to apply this reasonableness standard to determine whether default
interest provisions in real estate mortgages are enforceable.32 Under the
reasonableness standard, a court, taking into account the totality of sur-
rounding circumstances, will determine whether actual damages are
difficult to establish and also whether the default interest rate is reason-
ably related to the anticipated or actual damages the lender suffered as a
result of the default.33
Applying this standard, in MetLife Capital Financial Corp. v. Wash-
ington Associates3 4 the New Jersey Supreme Court observed that default
interest rates, like late fees, are presumed to be reasonable.3' However, an
unreasonable increase in the contract interest rate is unenforceable if the
years ago to the most creditworthy of borrowers with no hint of inability to repay. Courts
should recognize the utility of specifying a fixed default rate in the loan documents to
cover the full life of the loan.
30 See Bender, supra note 26, at 747. Consistent with the need for a finding of
substantive unfairness as required by most courts, presumably those courts applying a
sliding scale might be willing to find unconscionability in situations in which there is
great rocedural unfairness but only slight substantive unfairness.
SSee MADISON ET AL., supra note 5, § 5:106.
32 See Art Country Squire, L.L.C. v. Inland Mortgage Corp., 745 N.E.2d 885, 893
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (adopting a reasonableness test citing MetLife, stating "[w]e agree
with the court's reasoning, and we therefore decline Inland's apparent invitation to
abandon the reasonableness test."); MetLife Capital Fin. Corp. v. Wash. Assocs., L.P.,
732 A.2d 493 (N.J. 1999).
33 Sometimes the court confuses and conflates the reasonableness standards under the
liquidated damages analysis and the unconscionability standards in cases concerning
default rates. See, e.g., Cantamar, L.L.C. v. Champagne, 142 P.3d 140, 151 (Utah Ct.
App. 2006) (considering whether default rate constitutes an unenforceable penalty by
determining whether the rate is unconscionable).
34 732 A.2d at 502.
35 See Mony Life Ins. Co. v. Paramus Parkway Bldg., Ltd., 834 A.2d 475 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) ("It is settled that a stipulated damages clause, such as that
present here providing for contractual default interest and a prepayment fee, negotiated
between sophisticated commercial entities, is presumptively reasonable. . . . Thus, the
party challenging the clause bears the burden of proving its unreasonableness.").
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size of the enhanced rate on default suggests punitive intent on the part of
the lender. The reasonableness standard is founded on a liquidated dam-
ages versus penalty analysis that looks to the impact of default and not
necessarily to the bargaining power or sophistication of the parties when
the contract was made. Therefore, the bar for meeting the reasonableness
standard should be the same regardless of whether the mortgage loan is
secured by residential or commercial property.
In situations in which courts have applied the reasonableness standard
to commercial and residential mortgage loans, a review of case decisions
indicates that courts nevertheless tend to uphold default interest rates,
particularly when they are within the bounds of industry custom. Courts
even have upheld default interest increases of 12 percent or more over the
regular contract rate and default rates of 18 percent or more,36 but these
cases turn on the prevailing custom in the marketplace and other circum-
stances unique to each loan.
In explaining the liquidated damages analysis in MetLife, the New
Jersey Supreme Court articulated the reason actual losses resulting from a
loan default are difficult to ascertain:
The lender cannot predict the nature or duration of
a possible default given many possible causes of
borrower delinquencies. Nor is it possible when
the loan is made to know what market conditions
might be ten or fifteen years hence and, thus, what
might be recovered from a sale of the collateral.
For example, a lender cannot know what its own
borrowing costs will be if the borrower defaults in
paying a loan in the future, nor accurately predict
what economic return it will lose when the bor-
rower fails to repay the loan on time or how much
in costs it will incur if the property is foreclosed or
the borrower files for bankruptcy.
37
36 See Citibank, N.A. v. Nyland, Ltd., 878 F.2d 620, 625 (2d Cir. 1989) (sustaining
17.5% default rate); In re Liberty Warehouse Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 220 B.R. 546, 552
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (upholding 14% to 22.8% default rate); In re Dixon, 228 B.R.
166, 170 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1998) (allowing default rate that doubled the contract rate of
18%); River Bank Am. v. Tally-Ho Assocs., Civ. A. No. 90L-JN-21, 1991 WL 35719, at
*6 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 1991) (upholding 10% to 24%); Chem. Bank v. Am. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 535 N.E.2d 940, 947 (1M. App. Ct. 1989) (sustaining greater of
4% over prime or 20%).
37 MetLife, 732 A.2d at 503.
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As the court in MetLife held, the reasonableness test can be applied either
as of the time when the contract was made or when it was breached.38
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the lender's internal costs
of administering the defaulted loan are difficult to ascertain. As the New
Jersey Supreme Court pointed out in MetLife, these costs might include
"sums required in the context of collection activity, such as travel costs,
expert fees and the costs of its loan officers' involvement in collection
activities. 39 Moreover, although the lender conceivably could keep track
of the time its employees spend addressing the defaulted loan, it would be
challenging for a court to determine an appropriate hourly rate of com-
pensation for the lender.40 Other costs relating to default that are difficult
to quantify include the impact on the lender's financial statements caused
by the lack of anticipated investment capital from repayment of the de-
faulted loan.
Moreover, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a lender to
estimate the cost of lost investment opportunities caused by the bor-
rower's default. For example, in the event of a payment default, a lender
may not be able to raise the threshold amount it needs to achieve a higher
rate of reinvestment through investing in overnight funds and other in-
vestments that depend on the amount of capital the investor can pool in a
short period of time.
As the court pointed out in MetLife, a legitimate factor in assessing
the reasonableness of default interest is the heightened risk of nonpay-
38 See id. ("adopt[ing] the 'modem trend' that the reasonableness test is applied
either at the time the contract is made or when it is breached."). This view suggests that if
a court finds the liquidated damages clause to be reasonable at either the time of contract
or of breach then it will be enforceable. See also Thanksgiving Tower Partners v. Anros
Thanksgiving Partners, 64 F.3d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1995); Yockey v. Horn, 880 F.2d 945,
952-53 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding liquidated damages clause when reasonable damages
estimate could be made at time of breach or at time of contract formation). However, a
number of jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, apply the reasonableness standard only
at the time the contract is formed. See Kelly v. Marx, 705 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Mass.
1999) ("We agree ... that a judge, in determining the enforceability of a liquidated
damages clause, should examine only the circumstances at contract formation."). A few
other jurisdictions, including California and Louisiana, have resolved the issue by statute.
See Weber, Lipshie & Co. v. Christian, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting CAL. Ctv. CODE § 1671(b)). By contrast, the unconscionability analysis should
be applied at the time the contract was made. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (amended 2003), 1
U.L.A. 404 (2004) ("If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any term of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to
enforce the contract .... ).
39 Metlife, 732 A.2d at 503.40 See id.'
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ment that the lender faces in the event of a default.4 Suppose for example,
after defaulting on a loan and having the indebtedness to a lender acceler-
ated, the borrower were to approach another bank or lending institution
asking the new bank for a new loan of the indebtedness amount to redeem
and refinance the defaulted loan with the original lender. Assuming that
the new lender would be willing to lend money to borrowers who had
already proven themselves to lack creditworthiness, what interest rate
would the new lender charge for refinancing? If the new lender were
willing to make the loan, the lender likely would charge a rate substan-
tially higher than the original loan's contract rate to compensate for the
exceedingly high risk of default. This additional risk premium justifies the
step-up from the regular contract rate to the default interest rate.
Noted real estate practitioner Harris Ominsky pointed out a related
"car wreck factor" justifying increased compensation for the lender in the
event that the borrower cures the default and restores the loan.42 He likens
the mortgage loan, once subject to a default, as akin to a once-wrecked
automobile. Although the car is repaired, it is "forever blemished in the
marketplace. '43 Similarly, even if a borrower cures the default, "the loan
may be worth less on resale [in the secondary or securitization markets]
because the borrower has demonstrated its unreliability.
44
41 See id.
42 OMINSKY, supra note 7, at 68. Even where the loan has been accelerated, it is
possible that the borrower may convince the lender to allow reinstatement and cure of the
loan, or the borrower may be entitled to cure by contract provisions, the statutory rights to
reinstatement in some jurisdictions, or the cure of the loan by a Chapter 11 reorganization
plan. As discussed supra at note 2, it is unclear whether such reinstatement laws would
allow a surviving default rate. For bankruptcy purposes, the reorganization plan
potentially can nullify the lender's right to receive continued default interest. See, e.g., In
re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc., 850 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1988), called into question
by 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (2000) (ruling that after curing all defaults under bankruptcy plan,
debtor was entitled to nullify all consequences of default, including default interest rate).
But see Hassen Imports P'ship v. KWP Fin. VI 256 B.R. 916, 924 n.13 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2000) (questioning the continuing validity of Entz-White in light of 1994 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (2000), that provide the amount needed to cure
a default "shall be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and
applicable nonbankruptcy law"); In re Liberty Warehouse Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 220 B.R.
546 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding where loan matured prepetition, creditor entitled to
interest at default rate, rejecting Chapter 11 plan proposal to pay creditor at nondefault
rate). 3 OMINSKY, supra note 7, at 68.
4Id.
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IV. DEFAULT RATES IN BANKRUPTCY
Most reported cases scrutinizing default interest clauses are decided
in the context of federal bankruptcy proceedings. In the case of post-
petition default interest, some bankruptcy courts apply a reasonableness
standard on the assumption that they are mandated to do so under section
506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.45 This section allows the lender "interest
on [its mortgage loan balance] claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or
charges provided for under the agreement. 46 Some courts have recog-
nized that under the plain language of this provision the interest rate
arguably need not be reasonable. Rather, reasonableness is required only
of "fees, costs, or charges" such as late fees or prepayment charges.47
Nevertheless, most bankruptcy courts tend to invoke equitable principles
and limitations in subjecting the default interest provision to stricter
scrutiny than under an unconscionability or exorbitance standard.48
45See, e.g., In re AE Hotel Venture, 321 B.R. 209 (Bankr. N.D. Inl. 2005) (treating
default interest as a late fee rather than as interest and thus subject to the statutory
reasonableness requirement).
46 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2000).
47K & J Prop., Inc. v. PWP Golden Eagle Tree, LLC, 338 B.R. 450 (Bankr. D. Colo.
2005% See In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Tex. 1998) (allowing a default
rate 2% higher than the contract rate to apply because default interest rates are generally
allowed unless the "higher rate would produce an inequitable ... result") (quoting In re
Laymon, 958 F.2d 72, 75 (5th Cir. 1992)). See also In re Terry Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 241,
243 (7th Cir. 1994) ("What emerges ... is a presumption in favor of the [default] contract
rate subject to rebuttal based upon equitable considerations."). See generally Craig H.
Averch, Michael J. Collins & Stephen A. Youngman, The Right of Oversecured Creditors
to Default Rates of Interest from a Debtor in Bankruptcy, 47 BUS. LAW. 961 (1992)
(critizing bankruptcy courts applying equitable discretion to constrain enforcement of
contractually agreed-upon default rates).
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V. ENFORCEABILITY UNDER USURY LAWS
Some courts have held that usury laws constrain default interest49
based on the rationale that a default interest rate that supersedes the
contract rate is nevertheless an interest rate for usury purposes because it
constitutes compensation for the use of borrowed funds.5" Default interest
is a heightened interest rate designed to compensate the lender for the
increased risk of lending to an already defaulting borrower and, unlike
late fees, is not intended to penalize the borrower for being in default.
Therefore, usury laws arguably should apply just as they would to other
types of interest rates, such as contingent rates or participating mortgages
with so-called "equity-kickers."'', But many courts have held the contrary,
49 Like a savings clause that attempts to protect a lender against a usury claim,
lenders frequently add disclaimer language in the note, mortgage, or both to govern
default rates and late fees. A typical disclaimer clause might read as follows: "If the law
governing loan charges is finally interpreted so that the interest or other loan charges
collected in connection with the loan exceed the permitted limits, then such excess shall
be credited to reduce the principal balance of the loan, or any excess sums already
collected shall be refunded to the Borrower." Such disclaimers are of questionable value.
See Jersey Palm-Gross, Inc. v. Paper, 658 So. 2d 531, 535 (Fla. 1995) (upholding a
finding of usury notwithstanding a savings clause and concluding "a usury savings clause
cannot, by itself, absolutely insulate a lender from a finding of usury."). See also Swindell
v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 409 S.E.2d 892, 896 (N.C. 1991) (holding "the 'usury
savings clause' . . . cannot shield a lender from liability for charging usurious rates," the
court reasoned as follows: "The [usury] statute relieves the borrower of the necessity for
expertise and vigilance regarding the legality of rates he must pay. That onus is placed
instead on the lender, whose business it is to lend money for profit and who is thus in a
better position than the borrower to know the law. A 'usury savings clause,' if valid,
would shift the onus back onto the borrower, contravening statutory policy and depriving
the borrower of the benefit of the statute's protection and penalties. . . . A lender cannot
charge usurious rates with impunity by making that rate conditional upon its legality and
relying upon the illegal rate's automatic rescission when discovered and challenged by the
borrower."). Other jurisdictions are divided over whether the existence of a usury savings
clause will insulate the lender from usury sanctions in such situations. Texas courts
repeatedly have acknowledged the validity of usury savings clauses and enforced such
clauses to defeat a violation of the usury laws. See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561
S.W.2d 777, 786 (Tex. 1977); Woodcrest Assocs., Ltd. v. Commonwealth Mortgage
Corp., 775 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. App. 1989). But see C & L Invs. v. Fiesta Group, Inc.,
248 S.W.3d 234, 244 (Tex. App. 2007) (observing this outcome is limited to appropriate
circumstances and stating the mere presence of a savings clause will not rescue a
transaction "necessarily usurious by its explicit terms.").
50 See, e.g., Wagnon v. Slawson Exploration Co., 874 P.2d 659, 660 (Kan. 1994)
("When a note provides for a higher rate of interest after default or maturity, interest at
that rate is recoverable if it is not in contravention of the usury law or otherwise illegal.").
51 See Brown v. Cardoza, 153 P.2d 767, 769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944) ("The law is well
settled in most jurisdictions, including California, that where there is a loan of money to
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reasoning that default interest is invoked depending upon a contingency
within the borrower's control, namely, the failure to make a timely pay-
ment.52 In any event, the issue is moot for most banks and other lenders
because statutory exemptions exist under federal and state law that apply
to many types of mortgage loans."
VI. UNCONSCIONABILITY STANDARD SHOULD GOVERN
Late charges in mortgage loan transactions speak principally to the
defaulting borrower's past conduct, whereas default interest mainly
addresses the lender's risk of future loss based on the borrower's actual
payment performance. Accordingly, late charges are in the nature of
damages for the borrower's breach of the contractual promise to make
timely debt-service payments. Therefore, in scrutinizing the enforceability
of late payment charges under state law, courts tend to apply the liqui-
dated damages standard of reasonableness. By contrast, in testing the
enforce-ability of default interest provisions, courts more often have
applied the more lax (from the lender's perspective) unconscionability
standard.54
be compensated for by a share in earnings, income or profits, in lieu of or in addition to
interest, in determining whether the transaction is usurious the share of earnings, income
or profits must be considered as interest.").
52 See, e.g., Hayes v. First Nat'l Bank of Memphis, 507 S.W.2d 701 (Ark. 1974)
(holding that such charges were free from usury because the purchaser had it in his power
to avoid the penalty by paying the debt); First Am. Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cook, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Stuchin v. Kasirer, 568 A.2d 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1990); Heelan v. Sec. Nat'l Bank, 343 N.Y.S.2d 417 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1973);
see generally Bruce J. Bergman, Interest Rate Upon Default, 218 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1997). But
see Begelfer v. Najarian, 409 N.E.2d 167, 172 (Mass. 1980) (rejecting the Hayes rationale
because "[t]his argument assumes that persons who do not make timely payments are
financially able to do so, but voluntarily choose not to pay.").
53 Federal law preempts the application of state usury limits to many residential
loans. See Bender, supra note 26, at 733. There is also a myriad of state law exceptions to
those usury laws that survive. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25118 (West 2004) (exemption
from the state usury law where parties have a "preexisting personal or business
relationship," or if the parties "could reasonably be assumed to have the capacity to
protect their own interests in connection with the transaction"); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
205/4 (2007) (exemption from the state usury law for any loan made to a corporation);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49 (2007) (usury law shall not apply when a party notifies
the attorney general of its intent to engage in the transaction); MO. REV. STAT. § 408.035
(2007) (offering numerous exemptions from the usury laws including exemption of all
loans to corporations, general partnerships, limited partnerships, or limited liability
companies).
54 See STEVEN W. BENDER, CELESTE M. HAMMOND, MICHAEL T. MADISON, &
ROBERT M. ZINMAN, MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND LAND TRANSFER: A
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Courts that apply a liquidated damages or reasonableness standard to
default rates incorrectly view a default interest rate as a provision for
determining damages for breach of contract.5 Rather, the default rate is a
contractual interest rate that supersedes the regular contract rate when the
investment risk for the lender is increased because of default, and should
be respected as such under freedom of contract principles. Default interest
is a contractual rate that adjusts on default in the same way a variable
interest rate in a loan contract changes as the risk of inflation fluctuates
over time.56 Another example is a participating mortgage loan in which
the interest charged to the borrower is a contingent rate that can change
depending upon the gross or net income received by the borrower from
the mortgaged property.57
TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 243-45 (4th ed. 2008). See, e.g., Pierce v. Emigrant
Mortgage Co., 463 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226 (D. Conn. 2006) (applying Connecticut law).
Lenders should be aware of the potential remedies awarded for rates held to be
unconscionable. The few cases actually finding the challenged rate to be unconscionable
generally have reduced the excessive rate to a fair one without further penalty. See, e.g.,
Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 847-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), (affirming trial
court's reduction of 200% rate to 24%). See also In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp.
864, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (instructing bankruptcy judge on remand to reduce to a
reasonable rate any interest it finds unconscionable). But see In re White, 88 B.R. 498,
511 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (holding 58% default rate unconscionable; the court said it
lacked authority to reform the note to a reasonable default rate, but the lender apparently
could recover at the 16.5% nondefault contract rate).
55 Applying the liquidated damages standard to default interest, thus treating late fees
and default interest alike, is not entirely free of reason. Late fees compensate for the
otherwise unreimbursed internal costs of administering the defaulted loan, and thus are
suited for the liquidated damages analysis. Default interest, by contrast, is meant to
compensate for the additional risks posed by the borrower who has proven to be
uncreditworthy. But some portion of the default rate is meant to encompass internal costs
of administering the defaulted loan and other damages that could be said to flow from the
borrower's breach. This component of default interest arguably calls for the
reasonableness standard. Ironically, the tendency of courts to view the collection of late
fees and default interest at the same time as untenable might compel lenders to separate
their collection and thus enhance the possibility that the default rate might invoke the
reasonableness standard. On balance, the compensation function of default interest for risk
management outweighs the internal cost reimbursement function and, therefore, default
interest is best scrutinized under the unconscionability standard and not the more strict
(from the lender's perspective) liquidated damages or reasonableness analysis.
56 See Bender, supra note 26, at 774-75 (articulating the elements of a fair contract
interest rate to encompass the risk of inflation, as well as the lender's cost of obtaining the
money lent, its cost in making and administering the loan, the risk of default, and the need
for a fair profit over these risks and costs).
57 See MADISON ET AL., supra note 5, at § 5:17.
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Default interest provisions also can be described as a variable-pricing
provision, a term of the contract that provides for an interest-rate increase
if the lender's risk of future loss is increased by borrower default. Courts
recognize that default interest represents a variable interest rate that
reflects the heightened risk of repayment triggered by the borrower's
default . 8 Such a variable-pricing mechanism makes economic sense for
lenders. Suppose, for example, that a bank that makes residential mort-
gage loans to one hundred customers per year was compelled to foreclose
on three or four properties per year because of borrower default. A rea-
sonable business strategy for the bank is to segregate the defaulting
borrowers from the credit worthy borrowers and charge the former a large
enough rate of default interest to make itself whole again. Then, the bank
still is able to offer competitive rates on loan products in a fiercely com-
petitive marketplace. This way, the class of borrowers responsible for the
heightened risk shoulders the financial burden posed by the risk of de-
fault, rather than having the lender's innocent customers bear the risk.
This approach is a mainstay of the credit card industry. Banks that
make credit card loans at low introductory rates automatically will rele-
gate a defaulting borrower to a high-risk category where interest charges
can double or triple. For example, as of late July 2006, Bank of America
Rewards American Express Card was offering a promotional rate of
0 percent on credit card access checks and balance transfers from July
2006 to June 2007 with the understanding that if any payment was not
received by the due date the rate would automatically increase to
24.99 percent.5 9 Similarly, alternative pricing based on risk levels has
been used commonly in the real estate investment community. For exam-
ple, in marketing securities on Wall Street, Real Estate Mortgage Invest-
ment Conduits and other mortgage conduits offer collateralized mortgage
obligations and commercial mortgage-backed securities to separate
classes or "tranches" of investors based on varying price-risk ratios.60
58 See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Nyland Ltd., 878 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1989). The court
concluded that the default rate in question was "simply part of... [the] bargain" included
to offset the "increased risk of non-collection." Id. at 625. The court further opined that
when creditors are not allowed to impose such variable rates based on performance or
default it would be worse for debtors overall who would likely see increased rates over the
entire life of the loan in order to "reallocate the risk" of default. Id.
59 Arguably, credit card loans hold fewer options for the distressed borrower than
realty loans. Credit card borrowers in default likely will suffer the default rate on the
uncollateralized loan until the balance is paid down over time. By contrast, the realty
borrower at least has the option, should it perceive unfairness in the default rate, of selling
the collateral and redeeming the loan.
60 For example, mortgages are purchased from banks and sold to a trust that issues
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Compelling public policy reasons exist as to why courts should not
apply the stricter reasonableness standard to default rates:
(1) A restrictive judicial approach that impedes the enforceability of
default interest provisions could have a devastating impact on the second-
ary mortgage market for commercial and residential loans and the securi-
tization of these loans by mortgage conduits that depends on standardiza-
tion of loan terms and uniformity in legal treatment of such terms.
(2) Mortgages held on properties in a reasonableness standard state
would be less desirable investments for institutional investors (who serve
as a source of real estate financing) than investments in states with the
unconscionability standard. This would encourage movement of debt
capital outside the state or higher contract (nondefault) interest rates for
borrowers.6
(3) Restricting enforceability of default interest provisions would
disrupt customary and traditional mortgage lending practices.
(4) Restricting enforceability of default interest provisions would
force lenders to add the costs compensated by such provisions to the
initial contract rate of interest, thus penalizing meritorious borrowers who
have proven creditworthy over the life of the mortgage loan by increasing
their borrowing costs.
VII. PLANNING SUGGESTIONS FOR LENDERS
The following practice tips should aid lenders in any challenge to the
default interest rate, particularly those leveled under the common law
doctrine of unconscionability:
(1) Ride with the herd. Lenders should set their default rates with an
eye toward those of the market.62 Lenders already tend to do this for the
contract rate given the intense competition for rates in the marketplace.
Apart from consistency with rates of competitors for similar loans, lenders
should be prepared to justify any rate in terms of the actual or threatened
securities called collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) with different priorities as to
mortgage payment flows and claims against the underlying assets that are being
mortgaged. Typically, debt-service payments are first used to service the senior class, or
tranche, and to retire these Class A securities. Purchasers of these senior debt securities
will pay more for their securities as compared to purchasers of the higher-risk junior debt
obligations. See MADISON ET AL., supra note 5, ch. 4.
61 See OMINSKY, supra note 7, at 83 (observing that a state that scrutinizes default
interest and late charges too vigorously might cause higher contract interest rates for in-
state borrowers or cause lenders to avoid the state).
62 See Metlife Capital Fin. Corp. v. Wash. Ave. Assocs., 732 A.2d 493, 501 (N.J.
1999) (looking to evidence of industry custom in enforcing default rate under
reasonableness standard).
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risk posed to the lender by default, including the potential costs the lender
would incur on default by a particular borrower and upon default of
borrowers in the same or similar loan programs.
(2) Do not be a greedy hog. Although courts may tolerate some mild
forms of overreaching, they tend to eat hogs. Most cases striking down
default interest under an unconscionability or reasonableness standard, or
even by a balancing of the equities in bankruptcy, do so when the default
rate is more than double the base contract rate.63 This is related to the
tendency of courts, in the context of sales of excessively priced goods, to
be critical of a price more than double the retail price.64 If the default rate
is double or more than double the contract rate, lenders should be pre-
pared to justify that rate. Similarly, some courts look to the spread be-
tween the default rate and the contract rate.65 For example, a contract rate
of 24 percent and a default rate of 40 percent might be less than double
the nondefault rate but still raises eyebrows because of the 16 percent
differential.66
63 See, e.g., In re Hollstrom, D.C., 133 B.R. 535, 539-40 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991)
(deeming 36% default rate a penalty when contract rate was 12% and there was no
evidence to justify default rate); In re White, 88 B.R. 498, 511 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988)
(deeming 48% default rate a penalty when nondefault rate was 16.5% and default rate was
grossly disproportionate to damages incurred by breach). In the case of a variable rate that
may fluctuate over the fife of the loan, the court inclined to consider a disparity ratio
should anticipate such movement of the contract rate over the loan term in judging the
fairness of a default rate that might apply at any time during the life of the loan.
64 See Bender, supra note 26, at 756. Still, courts applying the unconscionability
standard disdain any fixed mathematical ratio of substantive fairness. See id.
65 Courts that simply look at the ratio of the default rate to the contract rate
misunderstand the unconscionability analysis. The cases that look to the difference
between retail price and the actual sale price of goods, or at the seller's net profit in
relation to net profits of other sellers, are inapposite in a mortgage loan context. In the
context of the sale of goods, presumably the court can determine the seller's unique costs
that are readily determinable at the time of the sale. Mortgage lending is different. The
default rate represents the lender's estimation of its risks on default looking forward as
much as thirty years, and thus deserves appropriate leeway in the exorbitance analysis.
Rather than compare the nondefault rate to the default rate, courts more properly might
compare the charged default rate to a fair default rate in fight of the lender's particular
risks anticipated in the future. If that default rate is more than double the fair rate, then it
might be exorbitant. Still, some courts compare the contract nondefault rate to the default
rate, so the advice given above is well taken.
66 See, e.g., In re Liberty Warehouse Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 220 B.R. 546, 552 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998) (observing that the spread between the nondefault and default rates of
interest of 8.8% was smaller than the differential present in most cases in which courts
found the default rate to constitute a penalty, citing spreads of 9% to 10%, 14.5%, 18%,
24%, and 35%).
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(3) Lenders who charge default interest should take special measures
to assure the procedural fairness of their loans, especially when the de-
fault rate significantly exceeds 67 the customary default rate, or when the
contract rate exceeds the prevailing nondefault contract rate.68 Sometimes
the lender requires the borrower to sign a separate default interest rate
rider attached to the note, the mortgage, or both. In addition, the loan
commitment letter may require the borrower to acknowledge that the
borrower has consulted with an attorney to make certain that the borrower
understands the legal consequences of such default provisions. Courts are
more likely to find borrowers represented by counsel to be sophisticated.
Represented or not, lenders might have their borrowers acknowledge in
writing by means of a default rate rider, or in the note or mortgage itself,
that the rate charged is justified in relation to the loan risks and costs, and
that the borrower understands the rate charged. The same efforts to avoid
the image of an inexperienced borrower who is relying solely on the
lender for advice and protection can aid lenders in lender liability litiga-
tion when the loan relationship is alleged to be a fiduciary one. In general,
lenders should avoid misrepresentation or manipulation to mask the
contract or default rate they plan to charge.
(4) Unlink late fees from default interest. In both drafting and applica-
tion of loan provisions, lenders should ensure that any late fee operates
separately from the default rate. For example, the loan documents should
not authorize late fees following acceleration. The default rate might be
best limited to the time period after acceleration, thus preventing late fees
and default interest from overlapping.69
67 This suggestion is based on the tendency of courts, when striking down price terms
for unfairness under the unconscionability standard, to do so where the price is at least
double the fair value of the goods. Arguably, then, the default rate ought to survive unless
it is more than twice what a fair interest rate on default would be.
68 As with the default rate, the nondefault contract rate is subject to scrutiny under
the unconscionability standard. See generally Bender, supra note 26. Because the
nondefault rate governs in the absence of a breach, there should be no occasion
whatsoever to consider application of the reasonableness standard for liquidated damages
to the nondefault contract rate.
69 Of course, as discussed supra at note 55, unlinking default interest and late fees
actually could increase the likelihood of a reasonableness standard being applied to the
enforceability of the default interest. An alternate approach would be for the lender to
draft the loan documents to allow the concurrent recovery of default interest and late
charges but to articulate in the loan documents the justification for these respective
charges and ensure that, while all possible costs and risks are addressed, there is no
overlap in their articulation.
Triggering the default rate upon acceleration, rather than after default, will require
some post-default attention to navigate a Ninth Circuit decision that ignored the language
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(5) The commercial lender confronted with an unconscionability
challenge to its rate should set the tone for the dispute by citing to court
decisions that have counseled judicial restraint in interfering with com-
mercial interest rates. 70 The lender also might try to argue in cases of first
impression that judicial review for conscionability is inconsistent with the
legislature's exclusion of commercial loans from the state's usury limits.7'
Finally, the lender could point to decisions according wide latitude when
determining whether the foreclosure price is so low that it shocks the
court's conscience-in essence an unconscionability challenge.72
of the mortgage note and required that the lender provide the debtor notice of acceleration
before it could begin collecting default interest. See In re Crystal Props., Ltd., L.P., 268
F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001) (although note provided for acceleration and accrual of default
rate without notice or demand, court held the lender needed to take affirmative action to
put the debtor on notice that it accelerated loan, which in this case was not until the lender
recorded a notice of default).
70 See, e.g., In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
("There are important considerations of policy in favor of promoting the availability of
funds for businesses in distress, even at unusually high rates of interest"); Bekins Bar V
Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983) ("To find unconscionability on these facts
would discourage other lenders from advancing funds to businesses that find themselves
in financial difficulty because of the possibility that a court would disallow the cost of
high risk capital"). See also Shriver v. Druid Realty Co. of Balt. City, 131 A. 815, 819
(Md. 1926) (holding that to relieve corporation from alleged excessive rate would chill
credit for "hazardous or venturous enterprises."). Because commercial loans tend to
involve sophisticated borrowers, or borrowers represented by counsel, there is a greater
likelihood that courts will find an absence of unfair surprise in such loans and thus an
absence of unconscionability, leading the courts to defer more often to freedom of
contract in the commercial loan setting. See, e.g., LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Freshfield
Meadows, L.L.C., No. CV 9903648315, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3648, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2004) (enforcing default rate of 24% when the contract rate was
11.95%, saying there was "no reason why, in a commercial transaction, the [borrower]
should not be bound by the agreement that it made."); In re Dixon, 228 B.R. 166, 177
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1998) (upholding a 36% default rate in a "lawful business transaction
between sophisticated parties").
7See Bender, supra note 26, at 747.
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.3 cmt. b (1997) (observing that
while "gross inadequacy" cannot be defined precisely, generally the court is not warranted
in setting aside a foreclosure sale, without any procedural defects in the sale process, that
yields more than 20% of fair market value). See also MADISON ET AL, supra note 5,
§ 12:40 n.8 (referencing cited cases). This is akin to the unconscionability analysis with
which some courts might find unconscionability based on substantive oppression in the
absence of procedural unfairness, but presumably would demand a greater showing of
inequity-hence at least a five to one disparity in price as the Restatement suggests. See
id. (noting that some courts are unwilling to overturn sales for gross inadequacy of price
alone, no matter how gross, without some procedural irregularity in the sale-in essence
concluding that substantive unconscionability alone is not enough without some
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(6) Pick one default rate formula and stick with it. Two-quarterback
systems may work in some college football programs, but they are risky
in commercial loans. Sometimes lenders structuring the default rate
borrow a page from the typical late fee formula that uses the greater (or
lesser) of a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of the late payment. In
one reported case, the mortgagee's default rate was the greater of the
contract rate plus 3 percent or the prime rate (as defined in the mortgage
note) plus 4 percent. Although the court rejected the argument that a
default formula tied to the greater of two formulas was an unreasonable
penalty per se, the lender invited trouble from a court with less deference
to the contract.73
VIII. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE CURRENT MORTGAGE
MELTDOWN
In 2008, a crush of media attention spotlighted the deluge of mort-
gages in default as well as the depression in the housing market in many
areas with stagnant sales and falling prices. Many lenders of troubled
loans were agreeing to "short sales"-a voluntary reduction of the mort-
gage loan balance to enable their borrower to sell the property free and
clear of the mortgage to avoid a foreclosure and resale in what then might
be an even worse market. The epidemic of short sales in lieu of foreclo-
sures suggested that, in many markets, the collateral value, with the
transactional costs of resale, had fallen below the loan balance. In such a
distressed market, lenders no doubt will incur losses whether absorbing
short sales or dealing with recalcitrant borrowers in foreclosure. Here,
default rates may hold little significance, as either judgment proof bor-
rowers or those protected by state deficiency laws may escape any impact
of default rates when the lender forecloses in a wounded market with
depressed values. Lenders must recoup those losses in better markets
when the stars align and the lender finds itself facing the borrower's
default with the collateral actually worth more than the loan balance and
procedural unfairness).
73 See Norwest Bank Minnesota v. Blair Road Assocs., L.P., 252 F. Supp. 2d 86
(D.N.J. 2003) (applying the New Jersey standard of reasonableness to default interest but
concluding that the alternative formula was simply an effort to address the vagaries of
market conditions the lender faced). In the analogous context of real estate purchase
agreements, some courts have applied the liquidated damages versus penalty standard to
strike down default clauses giving the seller the option on the buyer's default to retain a
specified amount of earnest money or to elect to recover its actual damages. See, e.g.,
Lefemine v. Baron, 573 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1991).
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the transaction costs of foreclosure. Lenders also continuously recoup a
portion of default losses from performing loans that weather real estate
downturns. But do these meritorious borrowers deserve to bear the full
brunt of bad loans and bad borrowers?
The current crisis reminds lenders (who received the same telegram in
the late '80s-early '90s savings and loan crisis) that mortgage collateral
can be a risky business, but the reminder is lost in the firestorm of finger
pointing. Until the recent rout in the asset-based mortgage markets lenders
were able to sell a loan, earn up-front transaction fees, and pass the risk of
default to third parties in the secondary mortgage markets. As a result,
underwriting standards were compromised just like they were prior to the
real estate shakeout starting in the late 1980s when office building loans
were being made in some areas despite vacancy rates of 20 percent or
more. There will be pressure in the markets to recoup and price this risk
into future loans. At the same time, borrowers are more attuned than ever
to the interest rates they are paying, meaning something has to give.
Courts need to recognize the utility of lenders offering lower interest rates
based on the condition, borrowed from the car insurance industry, that
they remain accident-free. Should a default occur, the damaged loan
justifies a higher rate commensurate with the new risks, and courts should
give the mortgage industry the leeway it needs to implement this equita-
ble formula that gives borrowers who prove worthy throughout the loan
repayment the benefit of a lower "crash-free" interest rate.
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